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ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT DESIGNS




Four alternative payment rules were examined to evaluate their ability to
accomplish the objectives of the development rights purchase program.  Paying the
true economic value for the development rights does not allow the program to
target high quality agricultural land.  Modifying the payment strategy by offering a
minimum payment will provide some extra incentive for high quality agricultural
land in areas with little development pressure, but will provide little help in areas
with high development pressure.  Indexing the payment to a representative
agricultural-use value for an area will provide premiums to high quality agricultural
land and discounts to low quality agricultural land which provides additional
incentives (disincentives) for high (low) quality land to enter the program.  This
representative payment rule can be modified in order to increase the participation
incentives to owners of targeted land.
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p ￿ (Mf ￿ Af) (1)
ALTERATIVE PAYMENT DESIGNS FOR FARMLAND DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS
An important issue faced by the DNR subcommittee is how to structure the development
right purchase payments so that is accomplishes the legislative objectives.  There are many
possible payment rules that could be used to implement the program.  However, the particular
structure of each payment rule will impact the type and location of farmland that participates in
the program.  The payment rule selected should be consistent with the goals of the program.
  The discussion in previous meetings suggest the committee feels its objectives are:
1. protect agricultural land from development for nonagricultural uses; and
2. give priority to protecting “high quality” agricultural land from development.
These objectives suggest that any payment rule should be designed so that payments for
development rights increase as development pressure increases and as the agricultural-use
“quality” of the land increases.  Let’s examine several alternative payment rules and their abilities
to accomplish the above objectives.
Development Value Rule
The most obvious payment rule to purchase development rights is to simply pay
landowners  an amount equal to the difference between the market value and the agricultural-use
value of the land.  The payment rule is 2 2
p ￿ max[Mf ￿ Af, min(Mf,F)] (2)
where Mf is the market value of the land for farm f which includes the right to develop the land in
the future and Af is the agricultural-use value of the land for farm f if no development option is
available in the future.
This payment rule is attractive because it compensates the landowner for the true
economic value from forfeiting the right to develop the land in the future.  This also makes the
rule easy to defend.
The drawback is that land with high agricultural-use value will receive smaller payments
than land with low agricultural-use value when both have the same market value.  In theory the
rule should provide exactly equal incentives for all participants to enter the program regardless of
the agricultural-use value of the land.  However, some landowners may difficulty with the concept
that their payment for the development rights of their land are lower than their neighbors simply
because they have better land.  In addition, there are a variety of factors which may cause a farmer
to place a higher value on the development rights of the land than the "true" payment calculated
using (1).  The pure development value rule provides no mechanism to deal with special
circumstances or to target land with high agricultural-use value.
Development Value Rule with a Minimum Floor Payment
A second alternative that has been discussed is similar the development value rule but
provides minimum payment equal to the lower of the market value of the land or some
predetermined floor payment value.  The rule is 3 3
p ￿ Mf ￿ Ar (3)
where F is the predetermined floor value.
This rule has many of the same features as the development value rule in (1) but also provides
some additional incentives for landowners with high agricultural-use values to participate in the
program.  For example, if the value of the minimum payment value of   is greater than min(Mf,F)
the increment value of the land   then the landowner receives a premium equal to the (Mf ￿ Af)
difference between  . This means that farmers with higher agricultural-use min(Mf,F) ￿ (Mf ￿ Af)
values will receive a larger premium which is consistent with the objective of attracting higher
quality agricultural land.
The drawback of the rule is the extra incentive is only available to landowners whose
development value is below the minimum payment level.  Unfortunately, this is most likely to
occur in areas with little development pressure.  Landowners in areas with high development
pressure will essentially operate under the development value rule in (1).  So a likely result from
this type of rule is to get a disproportionately high level of participation by landowners with high
quality farmland in areas with little development pressure.
Representative Development Value Rule
Another rule would be to base the payment on the difference between the market value of
the land and a representative agricultural-use value for a region.  The payment rule would be
where Ar is the representative agricultural-use value for an area.
This rule would no longer require the agricultural-use value of each individual farm to be
calculated (the market value would still have to be determined).  It would require the determintion4 4
p ￿ min[(Mf ￿ Ar)(Af/Ar),U] (4)
of a representative agricultural-use value for each region.  The rule provides a premium over the
true economic value to landowner’s whose agricultural-use value is greater than the
representative agricultural-use value for the area equal to Af - Ar.  However, land owners whose
agricultural-use value is below the representative value would be paid less than the true economic
value by an amount Ar - Af.  The rule will tend to attract high quality agricultural land into the
program in all areas; while low quality land will have a decreased incentive to enter the program. 
The representative value for a particular area can be adjusted (lowered) to increase the incentive
for high quality land to enter the program and lower the threshold where it becomes attractive for
lower quality land to enter the program.
Magnified Development Value Rule
A modification of the representative development value rule is to multiple the payout in
(3) by the ratio of the agricultural-use value to the representative value for the area.  The rule can
be written as
where U is the maximum allowable payment.
This payment rule is similar to indexed incremental value rule in (3) except that is magnifies the
premiums paid to landowners whose farmland’s agricultural-use value is above the representative
value for the area.  Likewise, the payment rule magnifies the discount to land owners whose land
has an agricultural-use value below the area’s representative value.  This rule will provide strong
incentives for high quality farmland in all areas to participate and little incentive for low quality
land to participate.  Again, the representative value can be adjusted downward to increase5 5
participation.  It is possible that the payment could exceed the market value if Ar is set at a low
value and so an upper limit, U, would be placed on the payment level at or below the market
value.
An alternative is to customize the development value payment by setting the
representative farm value equal to  where Am is the maximum agricultural-use (Mf)(Am)/(U ￿ Am)
value in the area.  This will ensure no payments can exceed the U and that only the highest quality
land in the area will receive a payment equal to U.  Each farm receives its own customized
representative value rule ensuring that its payment won't exceed U.  Setting U equal the farms
market value results in farmland with the highest agriculture-use value in each area receiving a
payment equal to the land's market value; which means the best land in the region receives
premium equal to its agriculture-use value.
Application of the alternative methods
Each valuation method is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 illustrates the payments
under each method as the market value and agricultural-use value changes; while Table 2 show
the premium each method provides over and above the "true" economic development value.  The
floor value is set at $1,000; the representative agricultural-use value is set at $1,000; and the
maximum allowable payment is set at the market value.  The development value rule shows the
true economic value that would compensate land owners for forgoing their rights to develop the
land in the future.  Adding the floor to the rule only increases the value when the market value
and agriculture-use value are close together (within $1,000 in the example).  This tends to provide
incentives for farmers with good farmland in areas with little development pressure to participate
in the program.  For example, the farmer with a $2,000 market value and a $1,500 agriculture-use6 6
value receives a payment of $1,000 which is premium of $500 over and above the true economic
development rights value; while, on the other hand, the farmer with $4,000 market value and
$1,500 agriculture-use value receives no premium.
The representative value rule provides a constant payment to all land owners with the
same market value for a given representative agricultural-use value.  For example, all the farms
with $2,000 market values would receive a $1,000 payment regardless of their individual
agricultural-use value.  As a result, farms with agricultural-use values below the representative
value of $1,000 are under paid, while farms with agricultural-use values above the representative
value are over paid.  For example, when the market value is $2,000 and the farm value is $500,
the payment is $500 below the true economic value of $1,500; while a farm with a $1,500
agricultural value receives a $500 premium over and above the true economic value of $500.
The magnified representative value rule simply increases the premium (discount) payments
to land with high (low) agricultural-use values.  For example, the farm with a $500 agricultural-
use value and a market value of $2,000 would now only receive a payment of $500 which is
$1,000 below the true economic value of the development rights.  On the other hand, the land
with a $1,500 agricultural-use value would receive a payment of $1,500, a $1,000 premium over
and above the true economic value of the development rights.  This rule accelerates the premiums
(discounts) to farmers as the quality of farmland increases.
The customized representative value rule sets a separate representative value for each
individual farmer based on the land's market value and maximum agricultural-use value in the
area.  If the land's agricultural-use value is above this customized representative value, the
payment will include  premium.   The rule ensures that the best farm land in an area receives a
payment equal to the land's total market value; which means the best farmland in the area will7 7
p ￿ min[(Mf ￿ Ar)(sf /sr), U] (5)
always receive a premium qual to the land's agriculture-use value.  For example, if the best land in
an area has an agriculture-use value of $1,500 and the market value is $4,000, the representative
agriculture-use value is $1,091 for the area.  Farmland in this area with an agriculture-use value
above (below) $1,091 will receive a premium (discount).  Any land in the area with a market
value of $1,500 will receive the market value; in this case $4,000 which is a premium of $1,500
over and above the true value of the development rights.
Tables 3 and 4 shows the payments and the  premium (discount) each payment rule
provides for the three farm case studies using the Mulvaney values.  The results assume the farms
are in the same region and that farm A is the maximum agriculture-use value in the area.
Other Modifications and Targets
The are a virtually unlimited set of alternatives payment rules that can be developed.  Each
alternative rule will provide different incentives and accomplish different objectives.  The "best"
rule  design will depend on the objectives of the program.  For example, suppose in addition to
attracting high quality agriculture land into the program it is desired that large tracts of land be
given some incentive to participate.  Then a rule(s) could be developed which provides incentive
to attract both  high quality land and large tracts of land into the program.  To illustrate, a simple
rule might be a modification of the representative development value rule such as:8 8
where sf is the number of acres of farmland and sr is the representative value.  Under this rule
farmland tracts that are larger (smaller) than some representative level receive a  larger (smaller)
premium or discount.9 9


























$2,000 $500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,000 $500 $666
750 1250 1,250 1,000 750 1,000
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,333
1,250 750 1,000 1,000 1,250 1,667
1,500 500 1,000 1,000 1,500 2,000
$4,000 $500 $3,500 $3,500 $3,000 $1,500 1,333
750 3,250 3,250 3,000 2,250 2,000
1,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,667
1,250 2,750 2,750 3,000 3,750 3,333
1,500 2,500 2,500 3,000 4,000* 4,000
Notes: The payment designated with asterisks are constrained by the upper payment limit of Mf.
The customized value for Ar = $857 when Mf = $2,000 and the maximum Af = $1,500.  When Mf =
$4,000 and the maximum Af =  $1,500 the customized value for Af = $1,091.10 10



























$2,000 $500 $0 $0 -$500 -$1,000 -$834
750 0 0 -250 -500 -250
$1,000 0 0 0 0 333
1,250 0 250 250 500 917
1,500 0 500 500 1,000 1,500
$4,000 $500 $0 $0 -$500 -$2,000 -$2,167
750 0 0 -250 -1,000 1,250
1,000 0 0 0 0 -333
1,250 0 0 250 1,000 583
1,500 0 0 500 1,500* 1,500
Notes: The payment designated with asterisks are constrained by the upper payment limit of Mf.
The customized value for Ar = $857 when Mf = $2,000 and the maximum Af = $1,500.  When Mf =
$4,000 and the maximum Af =  $1,500 the customized value for Af = $1,091.11 11
Table 3.  Application to Development Rights Cases Assuming




























A $4,776 $1,437 $3,337 $3,337 $3,776 $4,776 $4,776
B 1,634 840 794 1,000 634 532 954
C 1,523 1,224 299 1,000 523 640 1,295
Note: The payment designated with asterisks are constrained by the upper payment limit of Mf.
The customized values for Ar are $1,105 for Case A, $765 for Case B, and $739 for Case C.12 12





























A $0 $0 $439 $4,439* $1,439
B 0 206 -160 -262 160
C 0 701 224 341 996
Note: The payment designated with asterisks are constrained by the upper payment limit of Mf.
The customized values for Ar are $1,105 for Case A, $765 for Case B, and $739 for Case C.